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Abstract. In an aempt to stop phishing aacks, an increasing number of or-
ganisations run Simulated Phishing Campaigns to train their sta not to click
on suspicious links. Organisations can buy toolkits to cra and run their own
campaigns, or hire a specialist company to provide such campaigns as a service.
To what extent this activity reduces the vulnerability of an organisation to such
aacks is debated in both the research and practitioner communities, but an in-
creasing number of organisations do it because it seems common practice, and
are convinced by vendors’ claims about the reduction in clickrates that can be
achieved. But most are not aware that eective security is not just about reduc-
ing clickrates for simulated phishing messages, that there are many dierent
ways of running such campaigns, and that there are security, legal, and trust
issues associated with those choices. e goal of this paper is to equip organi-
sational decision makers with tools for making those decisions. A closer exami-
nation of costs and benets of the choice reveals that it may be possible to run a
legally compliant campaign, but that it is costly and time-consuming. Addition-
ally, the impact of Simulated Phishing Campaigns on employees’ self-ecacy
and trust in the organisation may negatively aect other organisational goals.
We conclude that for many organisations, a joined-up approach of (1) improving
technical security measures, (2) introducing and establishing adequate security
incident reporting, and (3) increasing sta awareness through other means may
deliver beer protection at lower cost.
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1 Introduction
Although phishing aacks are not a new phenomenon, they are still a major threat to
many organisations: small or large, national or international, public or private sector.
ere are a number of denitions of what a phishing aack is; in this paper, a broad
denition. Phishers try to
– either steal the (digital) credential of their victims to harm them directly, or
– use stolen (digital) credentials to carry out aacks on others, or
– install malware on the victim’s system, that can then be used to steal credentials
or other information, or make les unaccessible and extort payments to have them
restored.
A single employee who falls for a phishing aack can cause signicant damage to
an organisation, for instance if les that are needed for daily business are no longer
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available. Sometimes, it can also be the starting point for further aacks on customers
or suppliers.
To prevent their sta falling victims to phishing aacks, organisations resort to
running simulated phishing campaigns. In a simulated phishing campaign, email mes-
sages withmalicious links or aachments are sent to sta to see if they are ’vulnerable’
to this form of aack, and then present those who are with education or training mea-
sures that aim to help them recognise this form of aack - and thus not fall for them
in again. Given the plethora of security vendors oering toolkits or service for sim-
ulated phishing campaigns, many organisations are under the impression that this is
an essential measure to defend against such aacks. In this paper, we will examine the
dierent objectives and forms of phishing campaigns, and point out the challenges
associated with with conducting them in practice; we also present the associated costs
and potential side eects organisations should consider before deciding whether to
implement such a campaign.
We rst present various elements and types of phishing aacks (Section 2). In Sec-
tion 3, we examine the objectives an organisation has when conducting simulated
phishing campaigns. Section 4 presents the dierent forms of phishing campaigns, and
what choices an organisation can make when implementing them. In Section 5, we ex-
amine phishing campaigns from security, legal, and human perspectives, to highlight
the side eects and longer-term consequences for an organisation. Finally, in Section 6
we discuss to what extent the data collected during simulated phishing campaigns are
a valid reection of how vulnerable, or not, an organisation is to this form of aack.
2 Dierent forms and types of phishing messages
In this chapter we dene the types of phishing messages aacker send3. Phishing mes-
sages can be sent via dierent channels, be it by email, via messages and/or posts in
social media or social networks, via direct messages in messengers, or as text message.
It is important for organisations to be aware that aackers increasingly use other chan-
nels - such as text messages - to trick sta into make contact with the aacker, and
that in addition to malicious links or aachments, aackers may use media les, for
instance voicemails that seem to come from the chief executive ocer (CEO).
e contents of phishing messages can be dangerous in dierent ways. In a phish-
ing message, the recipient is usually asked to perform one of the following actions:
1. disclose sensitive data such as access credentials, condential documents, or credit
card data,
2. transfer money or make calls, e.g. to supposed friends or business partners (e.g. in
connection with the so-called CEO fraud),
3. disable or circumvent security measures, e.g. deactivate virus protection or install
a (malicious ”update”,
4. click on links or go to go websites, which
3 Some phishing messages are also referred to as spam. Spam includes any kind of unsolicited
messages, so phishing messages are a sub-set of spam messages - and indeed many sta do
not distinguish and use the ”spam messages” instead of phishing
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(a) either lead to a genuine-looking but fraudulent website, where sensitive data
such as login details have to be entered, or
(b) lead to a website that aempts to install and distribute malware on your de-
vices (just clicking on the link can cause immediate damage), or
(c) open dangerous aachments that contain malware or dangerous links.
e sophistication of phishing messages - and thus the diculty involved in detecting
them - varies considerably:
– Very easy to identify phishing messages contain noticeable spelling and grammat-
ical errors4 and/or incorrect presentation.
– Phishing messages that are moderately dicult to identify may look credible in
terms of content and presentation, but may come from an implausible sender (e.g.
sender’s email address5 or sender’s phone number). In some email clients, only
the sender’s name may be displayed, and checking the sender’s address requires
an extra action from the user - e.g. to hover the mouse over the name.
– Phishing messages that are dicult to identify are plausible in terms of content,
presentation, and sender. Accordingly, depending on the type of response desired
by the phisher, the message can only be recognised by the account or telephone
number, the URL behind the link, or the aachment type. Such messages can be
sent because, for example, real message content is copied from large providers (so-
called clone phishing), the email address is spoofed (faked), the salutatory address
is replaced accordingly, and the corresponding information is exchanged.
– Phishing messages are very dicult to identify if the phisher has access to a gen-
uine email account, and uses that to send plausible-sounding phishing messages
- and sometimes even referring to a previous email communication. e email
account is usually that of a person, e.g. a colleague, or another employee of a
customer or supplier. Aackers have also managed to gain access to the email
accounts of genuine service providers and sent phishing messages from there.
Phishing messages lead the recipient to believe that there is a - more or less plausi-
ble - reasonwhy she should carry out the requested action. Aackers oen add psycho-
logical triggers - such as creating time pressure, threatening punishment or promising
gains - are used67. e triggers steer the recipient towards carrying out the action, and
away from checking for signs that of a phishing message.
4 Note that on the other hand, not all message with incorrect spelling and grammatical errors
are phishing messages - with increasing digitalization and widespread use of social network-
ing, and increasing awareness of conditions such as dyslexia, much non-malicious wrien
communication contains such errors; when aackers impersonate some senders, it can even
be interpreted as a sign of authenticity.
5 It is important to check the sender’s e-mail address and not just rely on the sender’s name,
because the laer is very easy to alter.
6 Stajano,Wilson: Understanding Scam Victims: Seven principles for system security. Commu-
nications of the ACM 2011, 54(3):70-75
7 Again, the same tactics are used by senders of legitimate messages .
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Aackers pursue a range of dierent strategies: ey either try to reach as many
potential victims as possible with the same message, or they target their message at
a specic person: In the case of ’classic’ phishing, the aacker sends the same mes-
sage to all recipients available to him (i.e. not just to one organisation). Usually, the
salutatory address is ’Dear customer, dear ladies and gentlemen’. e message is per-
sonalised only if this can be done automatically, e.g. because the aacker aempts
to derive the name from the sender’s information (such as the email address), or be-
cause the name or the gender are known in addition to the email address (e.g. because
this information is also available on websites and can be read automatically). From
the aacker’s point of view, such a phishing aack is successful even if not all recip-
ients react to the message, but only a few to whom the message appears plausible at
the time - e.g. if a (phishing) message from Amazon one day aer having placed on
order. Classic phishing is mainly based on phishing messages with dangerous links
and aachments, as these are likely to be clicked / opened by many recipients. Phish-
ing messages of varying degrees of simplicity or diculty are used in case of ’classic’
phishing. Spear phishing is a form of phishing where aackers specically aack an
organisation or even a person. e aackers rst collect information - either purely
via the information freely available on the Internet about the organisation (e.g. cus-
tomers, service providers, cooperation partners, or newsleer), or via the sta or even
additionally via phone calls. Based on this bunch of information, organisation-specic
phishing messages (e.g. from a customer, service provider, or cooperation partner) are
then wrien. Due to the message’s reference to the organisation, and possibly to one’s
own position and function in the organisation, spear phishing is generally much more
dicult to identify than classic phishing.
3 Objectives of simulated phishing campaigns
In conducting a simulated phishing campaign, an organisation may pursue one or
more of the following objectives:
Objective 1: To determine how vulnerable – or resistant – the organisation cur-
rently is to phishing aacks (and how many identied phishing aacks are being re-
ported). Security sta may do this to obtain more budget for IT/information security
and/or data protection activities, or to make the case that a mandatory security aware-
ness campaign and/or security training should be introduced.
Objective 2: To demonstrate to sta who click that they vulnerable, and create a so-
called ”teachable moment”. Here it is assumed that someone who falls for a (simulated)
phishing message is particularly receptive to security awareness training immediately
aerwards. At the exact moment when they recognise they might have potentially
fallen victim to such an aack, sta are presented with information on how to recog-
nise phishing messages, and on how to report them. Creating a ”teachable moment”
- as opposed to providing this information as part of general awareness campaigns
or training - is supposed to be more eective because the awareness that one is vul-
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nerable is supposed to focus aention and increase motivation8. e security training
delivered at this point can be optional or mandatory. ere are two types of seings:
– (objective 2a) In this case, the number of sta who fell for messages, or reported a
messages, are not collected and reported. In this seing, the purpose of the simu-
lated phishing messages is purely to raise awareness of the organisation’s vulner-
ability.
– (objective 2b) In this case, the number of sta who fell for the message or reported
amessage are counted to evaluate the security awarenessmeasure, and (hopefully)
show that the campaign has decreased the organisation’s level of vulnerability.
is is typically measured as a percentage howmany simulated messages resulted
in a link or aachment are being clicked on.
Objective 3: (Scientic) evaluation of a security awareness measure deployed by
the organisation (or parts of it) - e.g. an awareness campaign or training module. In
this case, the simulated phishing campaign serves only to evaluate the eectiveness
of the security awareness measure - which may be a new product, or a new security
awareness measure created by researchers. Such quasi-experimental evaluations are
oen limited to subsets of sta.
Some organisations conduct campaigns purely for compliance reasons simply to
be able to report to an auditor or regulatory authority that the organisation has ”run
awareness campaigns” or ”trained sta”. Indeed, some audit procedures do not ask for
more evidence than that. However questionable, there is sometimes also the assump-
tion that by virtue of having conducted a simulated phishing campaign, the organisa-
tion can ’ooad’ the responsibility in case of a breach on the sta member who fell for
an aack, despite ”having been made aware” of the risks. Since this is not a responsible
approach, we will not consider this objective in this paper.
4 Simulated Phishing campaign designs
Simulated phishing campaigns involve sending various fraudulent messages to the
sta of the organisation over a certain period of time. ere are dierent ways of
designing and conducting such campaigns .
As outlined in Section 1, phishing campaigns can cover dierentmessage channels,
dierent types of dangerous content, dierent levels of diculty of phishing aacks,
with or without the use of psychological triggers, and dierent aack strategies.When
we refer to a simulated targeted spear phishing campaign, we use that term ”spear
phishing campaign”, and ”phishing campaign” for general ones. In addition, dierent
types of message content and sender type (e.g. the message comes from a person or
organisation) can be used. Messages can be sent with or without reference to recent
8 Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, Hong:Teaching Johnny not to fall for phish, ACM
Transactions on Internet Technology 2010, 10 (2):1-31
Melanie Volkamer, Martina Angela Sasse, and Franziska Boehm
events - the former increases the plausibility of the message, and hence the diculty
of recognising it as phishing910.
Campaigns can be carried out by the organisation itself - usually security sta,
who may use an o-the shelf product they can congure, or by creating messages and
the delivery mechanism from scratch. Alternatively, the organisation can commission
an external service provider, who may then sent simulated phishing messages from
within the organisation, or externally.
Phishing campaigns can be one-o or send repeated message over a period of time;
they can target all employees or a subset, and the same messages may be sent to all,
or messages may be targeted at subsets of employees. If a campaign involves multiple
messages, the order may be random, or the campaign may start with the easiest or
most dicult message, and increase or decrease in diculty, respectively. Additionally,
the level of diculty of the next message sent may depend on whether the previous
message was identied as a phishing one, or not.
Finally, there are several ways of how the organisation deals with the fact that such
campaigns involve deception:
– e victim is informed once fallen for a simulated phish. In addition, the victim
may or may not receive some information about phishing or explanations. If an
explanation is provided, it can provide a form of ”training by explaining”, e.g.
which signs in the specic messages could have been recognised as indicators of
phishing.
– e organisation issues a general statement or message to sta that makes them
believe that there has been a problem with the email service, but that does not
disclose that they have fallen for a simulated phishing message.
– e victim does not realise that he/she has fallen for a phishing message, e.g. be-
cause he/she is redirected to a legitimate website.
In the last two cases, all sta or those who fell for the deception can be informed at
a later date that they received phishing messages, and possibly be directed to further
explanation or training.
In general, the organisation can inform sta that a campaign has taken place, with
or without explanation. To do this by email is the most common form at the moment,
but some organisations have provided explanation and results via departmental meet-
ings or general sta meetings. is allows sta to engage and ask questions, and start
a dialogue on how simulated phishing campaigns are perceived.
Phishing campaigns can be announced – beforehand – more or less prominently
and in more or less detail. ere may even be contexts where no information at all is
given to the organisation’s sta.
As for the survey of the current state (Objective 1), the evaluation of the teachable
moment (Objective 2 b), or the evaluation of (newly developed) security awareness
measures (Objective 3), dierent parameters are considered and collected either indi-
vidually or in combination.
9 Burns, Johnson, Caputo: Spear phishing in a barrel: Insights from a targeted phishing cam-
paign. in Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce 29(1):24-39
10 Benenson, Gassmann, Landwirth: Unpacking Spear Phishing Susceptibility. Financial Cryp-
tography Workshops 2017: 610-627
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– e number of persons who per phishing message perform the relevant insecure
action (e.g. click on the link/disclose sensitive data/open the aachment).
– e number of persons who report/delete an identied phishing message.
– e number of persons who, aer having noticed it, report that they have fallen
for a phishing message.
– e number of persons who are unsure and inquire about the received message.
Reporting can also be done at dierent levels of detail - for example, for all sta or for
individual groups, or per phishing message or message type.
5 Problems with, and obstacles to, simulated phishing
campaigns
First of all, we will consider reasons against organisations carrying out a simulated
phishing campaign - irrespective of what the specic objectives of the campaign may
be. e organisation may think about it as testing how resilient it is against such at-
tacks, but sta may perceive it as being tested individually - and if they fall for a sim-
ulated phishing email, found wanting. e perception that they are being aacked by
their own organisation while working to deliver its productivity goals can have a neg-
ative impact on sta trust in the organisation, and the security and error culture. is
in turn can create a range of security problems. Furthermore, some aspects of simu-
lated campaigns may not be compatible with national employment or data protection
laws, or local agreements with labour organisations. All three aspects are discussed
below.
5.1 Security Aspects
Simulated phishing messages try to reproduce messages sent by aackers, and do so
with varying degrees of accuracy. Of the phishing messages mentioned in Section 2,
those calling on their victims to make cash transfers or phone calls and those asking
for security measures to be disabled or circumvented are more dicult to simulate.
While the message itself is easy to send, it is dicult to verify whether an employee
who received it thought it was genuine. Aackers sometimes send messages asking
the recipient to deactivate or circumvent organisational security measures - simulated
campaigns tend not to replicate this aspect because asking sta to do so poses a secu-
rity risk. is has however a negative eect on how well the collected data reects the
organisation’s actual vulnerability. An organisation needs to consider carefully what
type of messages it considers a threat, and whether simulating those messages, and
the actions some sta may take in response, create additional risk to the organisation.
Security problems caused by simulated phishing campaigns. Several security
problems can arise while conducting a simulated phishing campaign. First of all, the
infrastructure must be congured so that all simulated phishing messages reach the
sta that is being targeted. In the case of emails, the simulated phishingmessages must
end up in sta’s inboxes - if messages end up in junk or spam folders, sta will not
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see them. is can happen especially if the messages are sent by an external provider
of such campaigns.
ere are a number of obvious questions: How can congurations be changed?
Will the messages be tailored to each employee (considering his/her salutation) and
will exactly these tailored messages then be whitelisted?11 Or can only individual
senders or individual names of aachments or domains/URLs be whitelisted?12 In ad-
dition,the campaign provider usually has very limited knowledge of the infrastructure
and can therefore only propose very general measures to make phishing campaigns
possible. us, the risk of generally lowering the security level is correspondingly
high. Is it technically possible to use whitelisting prior to the actual security audit of
messages?13 Should the security audit itself be adapted?14 Organisations may end up
creating congurations that reduce their level of protection in general. is is partic-
ularly risky because because genuine phishing messages will still be sent - and now
are more likely to end up in sta inboxes.
Explanatory notes: (1) Whitelisting does not reect reality - the following infor-
mation would be missing: Are the phishing campaign emails really that ones that sta
need to identify, because the security measures in place would not recognise and re-
move them? Or does the campaign mainly contain messages which, without whitelist-
ing, would not reach the sta (and this would completely question the campaign’s ef-
fectiveness)? (2) If the argument is that, for the simulated phishing campaign, one does
not at all change the conguration, it must still be clear which of the campaign’s mes-
sages actually reached which employee - otherwise, the eectiveness of the campaign
again is questionable. If the argument is that almost all messages reach sta, one could
argue that the organisation needs to improve its technical countermeasures to reduce
its vulnerability. In addition, there is a productivity cost associated with sta with
dealing with those messages, and running a campaign requires further resources, and
is not without risks - so both in terms of security and economics, investing in beer
countermeasures makes more sense. (3) A change or reduction of the security mea-
sures for campaign purposes might violate organisations’ security policies, and lead
to signicant problems during security audits.
An additional risk associated with a simulated phishing campaign is that aackers
may use as a basis for a phishing aack. For example, the phisher can pretend to be
the campaign organiser, and send a phishing email to all known email addresses. is
email, for example, can contain a link or an aachment that is supposed to inform the
recipient about his/her own performance in the campaign. Such aacks are possible,
even if the sta have not been informed in detail in advance, since some sta end
up alerting colleagues - either with the best of intentions, because they think it is
an actual aack, or because they want to warn colleagues not to fall for the ”same
11 Wholesale general whitelisting means that phishers can take the same approach and can be
sure that their phishing messages reach the recipient.
12 is can still be used by phishers if this information is leaked.
13 Aer the security audit, whitelisting is not helpful, because with an adequate security level
of the security audit, most of the phishing campaign messages would be blocked and thus
would present no risk to the organisation and its sta. is, again has a negative eect on
how well the collected data reects the organisation’s actual vulnerability.
14 If an external email service provider is used, this change may not be possible at all.
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trick”. If the campaign is run an external provider, the provider may name customer
organisations in their advertising, and thus, sta may be forewarned, and aackers
alerted to a possible opportunity. Organisations who use external providers should
consider this carefully.
Explanatory note: Even if aackers have no concrete evidence that an organisation
is running simulated phishing campaigns, they may try this because, as simulated
phishing campaigns have become commonplace, sta are likely to have heard of them
and thus believe that their organisation is, even if there has been no announcement.
Security problems associated with informing sta about simulated phishing
campaigns Security problems can arise if sta cannot distinguish between simulated
phishingmessages, and real phishingmessages that are sent by aackers, because sta
might interact with a real phishing message (e.g. open the aachment, follow the link,
etc.) - in most cases, they do it they feel invited to interact with the messages and learn
more about them. Some sta may click on every link they see as a form of protest, be-
cause they feel it is unreasonable for the organisation to ”trick” them in this way. No
organisation can rule out that real phishing messages will reach their sta during the
campaign - unless they stop delivering all external emails and only send simulated
ones. If the organisation has promised there will be no negative consequences em-
ployees who fall for simulated phishing messages, they have to do the same for sta
who fall for real ones. It is very dicult to communicate that, on the one hand, sta
will not be punished for falling for simulated phishing, but at the same time, they are
requested to be alert at all times, and try their very best to recognise and report phish-
ing messages.e fact that it is not possible to distinguish between realistic, simulated
and real phishing messages during a campaign means sta are faced with an impos-
sible task - and we will return to the wider implications of this in the Human Aspects
section below. If the organisation puts sta in that position, punishing sta who ”fail”
is from a legal and ethical point of view indefensible. Also, it reduces reporting, which
plays an important role in reducing the damage of real phishing messages, because it
enables the organisation to adjust its email lter and communication to sta.
A further problem is what happens aer sta realise that they have fallen for a
real phishing aack may not report it, because uncertainty or fear of negative conse-
quences causes them to try to hide their failure and hope for the best. Others realise
they have failed, but then assume it is part of the campaign, are be annoyed for a mo-
ment, but then don’t report because they assume that their ”failure” has already been
logged.
Finally, whilst many sta are aware that distinguishing all simulated from real
phishing messages is an impossible task, some are not. Such sta may be happy to
have himself/herself identied a ”simulated” phishing message, but may not report it
because they have experienced a common side-eect of campaigns in the past: over-
whelmed help-desks and IT security sta who respond with (with varying degrees
of exasperation) ”thank you, but it’s a training message, no need to report but please
don’t tell anyone else”. Negative experiences of reporting will lead sta to think twice
before reporting again.
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Explanatory notes: (1) Of course an organisation could point out that it is actually
impossible to always distinguish between simulated and real phishing messages, and
request sta to report all suspicious messages. But explaining why it is subjecting sta
to training that has limited ecacy is challenging. (2) If the organisation is willing to
this, the reporting and investigation processes must be clearly regulated, communi-
cated, and integrated into everyday work. Sta must be given information on what to
do, and to whom they should report if:
– they are unsure about a message
– they identify a phishing message, simulated or real
– they have fallen for a phishing message, simulated or real
Assuming the organisation has established such reporting and investigation pro-
tocol, and that in the run-up to the campaign, it made clear that distinguished between
simulated and real phishing messages is not always possible, and thus reporting and
investigation is mandatory.
Assuming a reporting and investigation protocol is in place, and sta understand
and accept it, a phishing campaign will result in more reports and investigations. e
situation can also become more complex because (a) it is now possible for sta to get
feedback on which messages were simulated and real, (b) simulated and real phish-
ing messages identied in time can be reported, and (c) sta who have fallen for a
simulated or real phishing message can be told15. Rules for handling messages will
be amended accordingly. Depending on the objective of the phishing campaign, doc-
umentation tasks will be added. To deal with this added load, the organisation has
to either add sta to deal with these properly, or there will be longer waiting times.
Longer waiting times will be frustrating for stawaiting to hear whether or not to pro-
ceed with a message, and increases the risk that they do interact with it. And again,
delays in responses to reporting will reduce the likelihood of reporting in future. A
reporting and investigation system that struggles to manage reports to real phishing
messages will not be made beer by the additional load created by simulated ones.
Explanatory notes: (1)We have witnessed several cases of simulated phishing cam-
paigns in organisations being aborted or signicantly scaled back because IT helpdesks
and IT security sta were overwhelmed. In theory, the organisation should increase
the number of sta for reporting and investigation during the campaign to be pre-
pared for this. In practice, most organisations do not have suitable sta ”on tap”, and
the administrative workload and nancial implications of hiring temporary sta are
o-puing - so some providers of simulated campaigns are reluctant to raise the issue,
and play down the importance of reporting and investigation instead. (2) If there is
any omission or ambiguity in the reporting and investigation protocol, there will be
more enquiries because sta are unsure about how to deal with these messages and/or
incidents.
Regarding Objective 2b (measuring if the combination of phishing campaign and subse-
quent security awareness measures has an eect). In order tomeasure the exact eect of
15 Burns, Johnson, Caputo: Spear phishing in a barrel: Insights from a targeted phishing cam-
paign. in Journal of organisational Computing and Electronic Commerce 29(1):24-39
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the phishing campaign, no other security awareness measures should be provided to
the sta at the same time. So, if the phishing campaign does not have the desired eect,
the organisation has also lost the opportunity for other security awareness measures
related to phishing.
In order to achieve the objective 2b, the campaign should last as long as possible, or
even carry on permanently (to keep reminding sta of the risks of phishing). However,
running campaigns on an ongoing basis would also require regularly reducing the level
of protection (see above) - which most organisations will not want to do.
e level of diculty of the simulated phishing messages can also have a nega-
tive impact on security. Messages that are easy to identify as phishing - e.g. with bad
spelling and/or grammar, an unknown sender, or aachments with suspicious data
types - lead sta to believe that they can detect phishing. is makes them more vul-
nerable to sophisticated aacks.
5.2 Legal Aspects
Organisations have to pay aention to the specic laws of the countries in which they
operate and employ sta. In most cases (for Objectives 1 and 2b presented in Chapter
3), phishing campaigns will also measure work performance. is gives rise to legal
questions in the context of employment protection and data protection. In Germany,
for instance, the organisation’s works council needs to be consulted on any measures
to covertly assess sta. Data protection requirements may not allow identication of
individual sta, in particular in European countries.
In addition to law pertaining to sta, legal limits may arise from trademark law.
Messages pretending to be from other organisations, or clone phishing, may only look
credible if they include the logos of the providers (e.g. of SAP or Paypal). It is only
possible to do this without trademark infringement if campaigns are run purely in-
house, on the organisation’s own infrastructure, and do not express a business purpose
of their own. However, all phishing websites created are then restricted for use within
the organisation. It is also necessary to check whether the use of such logos conicts
with the organisation’s code of conduct or other rules - imitating a trademark can be
seen as a form of undermining that company’s reputation, and make sta doubt it’s
trustworthiness in future. Intellectual property laws and copyright protection of such
logos must be considered. All this needs to be claried before phishing messages are
sent. If clone phishing messages or messages from certain providers cannot be used,
this limits the signicance of the phishing campaign, as it is not possible to send the
kind of phishing messages that are common otherwise.
5.3 Human Aspects
In most organisations, security is not a particularly popular topic with sta. Most or-
ganisations havemany security policies, which stamay have heard or read about, but
oen nd impossible to understand or follow. Sta feel justied in ignoring security
policies and training that they nd impossible to follow and/or that noticeably re-
duce their productivity. With simulated phishing campaigns, sta are taught to check
many aspects of each message they receive - one campaign commissioned by a UK
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bank literally tells people to ”take 5” - minutes - before acting on a message. Since
most sta in modern organisations receive dozens or hundreds of emails per day, the
productivity reduction that would result from following this advice would be enor-
mous. Many organisations have security policies create impossible tasks, with serious
side eects: unsurprisingly, it creates resentment, and creates the perception that IT
security is ”impossible” and best ignored. Yet sta do not happily breach the rules -
they do worry about enabling a breach and being blamed for it, aer having failed at
the impossible task. Simulated phishing campaigns contribute further to this unhappy
state of aairs.
In a phishing campaign, the organisation ”aacks” its own sta. In particular, if
the campaign is conducted internally, one group of sta (usually from the IT or se-
curity department) aacks all others - though they may not aack the organisation’s
management. Depending on the design of the phishing messages, all sta aack each
other to a certain extent: since it is impossible for sta to distinguish whether the re-
ceived message is part of the simulated phishing campaign, a real phishing aack, or
whether the colleague wrote the message based on a message he/she received within
the campaign. As soon as word of the laer possibility has spread among the sta, dis-
trust among sta increases, and already dicult relationships will deteriorate further.
is, in turn, also leads to reduced productivity, and in the worst case, mediation talks
will become necessary.
If a campaign is announced, the sender will receive questions. If the sender is a
member of the IT or security department, and does not have a good relationship, they
might misinterpret those questions, which again would lead to new conicts. If the
campaign has not been announced, and a simulated phishing message is identied as
a phishing message, sta members may feel tricked, in which case resentment and
potentially conicts may follow. Phishing campaigns, in which messages from other
sta - e.g. the CEO or Head of Human Resources - are simulated, it may aect the
perception of those sta members, trust in the organisation. Sta who fall for (poorly
designed) phishingmessages might be perceived as stupid or careless, and treated with
disrespect. is also has a negative eect on the culture of the organisation.
Launching a phishing campaign without rst instructing sta (i.e., explaining how
to identify phishing messages, where to report if they are unsure, how to deal with
phishing messages they have identied, and where to report if they fell for such mes-
sages) is simply unfair. Simulated phishing campaigns are not likely to increase sta’
trust in the organisation’s management - particularly if the campaign is not widely
announced. Simulated campaigns are supposed to improve the security awareness
and skills of sta, but those who fall for a simulated message experience failure. Self-
ecacy has been shown to be the key factor in changing security behaviour: sta who
are condent in their ability to perform a new security task are signicantly more
likely to change behaviour than those who are not. Making sta experience failure a
security task can lead them to conclude they cannot reliably detect messages anyway,
and thus resort to reporting any message they are not absolutely sure of.
If the campaign has not been announced ocially, but rumours are circulating
through the organisation, further problems arise if the reporting and investigation
processes have not been clearly communicated in advance of the campaign: Sta are
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unsure of how to proceed if they have identied or fallen for a phishing message. Does
the same reporting process apply to simulated phishing?Why do I get thismessage and
others do not? Who knows now that I have made a mistake? What is the consequence
of this? Oen, sta feel unseled and controlled by phishing campaigns. Both will
have a negative impact on the organisation’s reporting culture. Another problem of
not announcing the campaigns ocially and in detail is that false information then
spreads quickly and is dicult to correct. Simulated phishing messages have to be
treated in the same way in the reporting and inquiry process. is not only requires
a great deal of eort and resources, but deceiving sta. Deception does not create
trust in the reporting and investigation system. is can even have a negative eect
on the level of protection if the consequence is that people generally do not want to
ask questions or do not want to report anything because they do not want this kind
of behaviour. Accordingly, phishing campaigns also have a negative inuence on the
organisations’ error culture.
If the phishing campaign is widely announced, sta will look critically at many
more messages, and may try to verify the sender, e.g. by phone. is again reduces
productivity, and being asked several times an hourwhether I really sent thatmessages
will not improve working relationships. organisations cannot expect work to continue
as normal during a simulated campaign - stamust be given time to deal with the extra
work of scrutinising messages and reporting them. If this is not the case, it increases
pressure and has a negative eect on the perception of the organisation’s leadership.
Further productivity losses can result sta becoming overly cautious, and treat-
ing legitimate messages as phishing messages. is means invoices are not paid, job
applications not considered, and queries by customers or suppliers ignored. Message
from any 3rd party - e.g. an external travel or survey company - now have a hard time
geing responses from sta in many organisations. A responsive reporting and inves-
tigation process that can quickly provide responses can help, but it requires signicant
resource.
e level of diculty of the simulated phishing messages can also have a negative
inuence on sta’ mood. If they are too easy, the impression can quickly arise that
the management thinks that sta cannot be identify obvious phishing aempts. If an
employee receives a second phishing message of the same type (aer one has fallen
for the rst one of that type), she gets the impression that the management suspects
that she still does not understand. Again, this does not have a positive eect on sta’
trust in the management.
Regarding Objective 2b (proof was given of the fact that the combination of phishing
campaign and subsequent security awareness measures has an eect). From the point
of view of the phishing campaign alone, this would mean that sta would only have
access to the information from the security awareness measure if they had made a
mistake. is easily leads to irritation and uncertainty. It leads to the situation that if
you want to know more (because you think you do not know enough) you have to
interact with phishing messages, which, as one knows, should actually not be done.
is has a negative eect on the self-ecacy of sta and reduces the level of protection.
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Regarding Objective 1 (assessing the current situation and then motivate for a subsequent
security awareness measure) and Objective 2 b). ese cases entail another problem:
Nobody likes being confronted with his/her own weaknesses. Being told what you
do wrong makes you feel bad. However, that’s exactly what may happen if phishing
campaigns are designed in such a way that sooner or later one nds out that one
has fallen for a phishing message. Very well-designed phishing messages are very
likely to have many victims, and they initially go through a negative experience. It
is questionable whether and how the willingness to learn how to identify phishing
messages in the future will increase as a result of a negative experience; it has been
shown several times that a lack of self-ecacy has a negative inuence on security
behaviour16. In the case of Objective 2b, it is particularly important to nd out whether
the sta who became victims were so shocked and surprised by their own failure that
they closed the document or exited the website quickly, so that no one else will notice
that they have fallen for a phishingmessage. Accordingly, the victims would not notice
that information on how to recognise phishing messages in the future is provided in
the message.
6 What do the numbers collected during the simulated
phishing campaign tell us?
Data regarding the people having fallen or having (not) reported are collected in case of
Objectives 1, 2 b), and 3. To achieve theses objectives, dierent data types - individually
or in combination - can be considered, i.e.:
1. the number of sta who perform the corresponding unwanted action per phishing
message (e.g. click on the link/open the aachment); this needs to be dened more
precisely (e.g. clicking on a link only, or entering access data or other sensitive
data17,
2. the number of people who report a detected phishing message,
3. the number of people who report that they have fallen for a phishing message
aer they have discovered the deception,
4. the number of people who respond with inquiries about messages.
e question is what can cause high or low numbers of people who fall for a sim-
ulated phishing aack.
e (external) validity of the results is strongly inuenced by several facts. First
of all, the external validity depends on the amount of information about the phishing
campaign distributed to the sta. A (large) part of the sta will be more sceptical about
the relevant messages than usual, will ask or inform colleagues, or generally talk about
it having discovered a phishing message. Others are so against ”aacking” sta that
they intentionally interact with every phishing message.
16 hps://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cybersecurity-culture-guidelines-behavioural-
aspects-of-cybersecurity
17 e laer quickly becomes another security problem. Because these sensitive data must not
be transferred.
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All this is especially true when the time frames for campaigns are short. At the
same time, short campaigns only increase the security risk for a short period of time.
All these inuencing factors should at least be considered as a limitation of the valid-
ity18.
It is also assumed that there is a well-established reporting and inquiry process
even before the phishing campaign starts. It would also be necessary for the process
to provide for the reporting of detected phishing messages, and not for how many
have been deleted. Otherwise, phishing messages cannot be distinguished from other
spam messages or other messages that are deleted. Part of the reporting and inquiry
process must also include the reporting of phishing messages that are already known
to have been reported by other sta (e.g. a colleague working in the same oce).
Explanatory note: It is strongly recommended to rst critically analyse one’s own
reporting and inquiry processes before considering a simulated phishing campaign.
In case you are wondering why it is not sucient to record the number of sta
who perform the relevant unwanted action per phishing message (e.g. click on the
link/open the aachment), please consider the following explanations.
Non-interaction can have many reasons and therefore cannot be interpreted as a
clear indicator that the message was identied as a phishing message: e message
was not seen at all because the person concerned was on vacation or sick, had no time
or was not relevant, does not have a corresponding account, or because a colleague
has already drawn aention to the phishingmessage.e laer does not mean that the
respective colleagues would have automatically identied the message as a phishing
message. It is not possible either to tell sta not to inform other sta, because this is
exactly what you want in the case of real phishing messages: Sta are supposed to
react and help others to protect themselves and the organisation.
Ultimately, the false positives would also have to be counted, i.e. messages that
were legitimate but were reported as a phishing aack and were therefore not pro-
cessed for the time being. To put it bluntly: A phishing campaign that has the conse-
quence that all phishing messages are reliably detected, but that also has the conse-
quence that every second legitimate message is deleted because it is considered to be
a phishing message, is not eective either.
e external validity of the results of a phishing campaign also depends on the
simulated phishing messages. e rule of thumb is: e easier they are to detect, the
”beer” the results. Simulated phishing messages that are extremely dicult to iden-
tify would hardly be recognised as such by anyone. Actually, the simulated phishing
messages would have to represent those from real aacks (and thus a multitude of
dierent ones), but for this purpose, messages from sta and external providers would
also have to be used, which would have a number of disadvantages (including the re-
lationship of trust between colleagues and the fact that one might have to check trade-
mark law aspects). All in all, the external validity should always be seen in relation to
the simulated phishing messages as well as in relation to changes in the infrastructure.
18 is is particularly true in the case of Objective 3, and any other evaluation would also have
limitations. Here, it may make sense to use dierent study forms for the evaluation.
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e results’ validity of the collected data also depends onwhether or towhat extent
other inuencing factors, e.g. media reports, can be controlled during the period of the
survey.
If Objective 2(b) is pursued, the following should be considered in addition:
Additional data would need to be collected. For the evaluation, it would be neces-
sary to knowwhether and how long the subsequent security awareness measures have
been dealt with. For this purpose, the data could only be collected in a pseudonymised
but not in an anonymised way. is must be checked for admissibility under data pro-
tection law.
7 Conclusion
e external validity of results for simulated phishing campaigns in general, and es-
pecially for some particular forms, is a maer of debate. Security experts and service
providers selling the services equate a reduction in click rates with reduction in vul-
nerability, while human factors experts point to the futility of training sta on what
is essentially an impossible task, and economists - and some organisational leaders -
count the mounting productivity losses caused by this countermeasure.
Our analysis has shown that creating a simulated phishing campaign that min-
imises additional security problems and is legally compliant is extremely dicult and
costly. Even if an organisation is willing to invest this much, the combined negative
impact of simulated phishing campaigns on the self-ecacy of individual sta, and the
reduction of inter-personal trust and trust in the organisation, and the reduced pro-
ductivity of all sta involved are enormous. e cost and negative side-eects clearly
outweigh the low external validity of a such a campaign, and the limited reduction
in vulnerability that results. We therefore recommend that organisations invest time
and money in (1) an improvement of technical measures. In addition, (2) appropriate
awareness measures should make sta aware of the type of phishing messages they
can reach despite all technical measures and of how they can identify them. Finally,
(3) the reporting and inquiry process should be improved. As a result, the eort for
each individual employee is comparably low and can be implemented. e level of
protection increases without negative eects on trust relationships and self-ecacy.
